The Path to War (1937-39) (Part B) 
 Source: K. Hildebrand, The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich (London, 1973), pp.51-90. 
 
 B. The Austrian Anschluss and British Neutrality 
 The diplomatic and military changes in Berlin of January and February 1938 took place against a background of increasing tension in German-Austrian relation 30 . In spite of the agreement of 11 July 1936, concluded with Mussolini's approval, which sought to encourage friendly ties, the relations between the two countries had deteriorated. What played a decisive role in the course of events was the fact that Italy, who in 1934 had still seemed to be determined to intervene for the sake of Austrian independence when the Austrian National Socialists made their putsch 31 , now stood firmly on the German side. As the Swiss historian von Salis once put it so vividly, this was the Berlin-Rome axis upon which Austria could be put on the spit and roasted brown 32 . 
 
 We do not wish to repeat in detail all the events surrounding the Austrian crisis, as they have been described often enough. But one question decisive for the success or failure of the German policy should once more be raised: how would Britain respond to a German move against Austria, a member of the League of Nations? Up until that time, all the European test-cases had turned out positively so far as Hitler was concerned. Admittedly, it is truce that he had not succeeded in achieving an alliance with Britain as the cornerstone of his policy. Nevertheless, British neutrality - even tough accompanied by a gnashing of teeth - seemed certain to him, and that would be enough for him to risk his headlong rush towards hegemony. So it was not surprising that during the whole of the Austrian crisis in the winter and spring or 1938 not a single serious warning was issued by Britain to Berlin. For Britain's position as a world power was no longer anything like that before the First World War. The economic power of the nation was weakened; the military preparedness of the country was less than perfect; the navy was no longer indisputably the best in the world; and the Empire was shaken by the revolutionary activities of colonial liberation fronts. Britain neither regarded it as expedient, nor did she seem in a position to get militarily involved in the problems of Central Europe. Anyway, in Chamberlain's view, this issue fell within the German sphere of interest. What was to become decisive after the outbreak of the Second World War was already beginning to become apparent. Only the United States of America, following in the footsteps of the once powerful Britain, would be in the position to take up Hitler's challenge adequately and, together with the Soviet Union, the other flanking power, re-establish world peace - admittedly of a very temporary and improvised kind. But in 1938 Britain's abdication of its role as judge and arbiter in the European system had not quite come to pass. Indeed, Neville Chamberlain resisted any attempt or appearance on the part of America to get involved in affairs, which the British Prime Minister regarded as European and British concerns 33 . 
 
 Probably influenced in no small way by what Sir John Simon and Lord Halifax had said on the Austrian question, von Ribbentrop and Hitler were agreed that Great Britain would never take on the risk of a large-scale war on account of a crisis in Central Europe. If we look back over the history of German foreign policy since 1871, there is a certain justification for maintaining that neither Bismarck nor Buelow, neither Bethmann Hollweg nor Stresemann ever had so much room for manoeuvre within the system of European and world nations as Hitler now had available to him in the Austrian crisis of 1938. Before the First World War, even the smallest claims on territory or frontier revisions had led to wars such as those, which shook Europe in 1912 and 1913 34 . But now a nation civilisee , a member of the League of Nations, could disappear off the map without London having seriously reacted! This brings us to the course of events immediately prior to the so-called Anschluss of Austria. 
 
 As so often happened, on this occasion too Hitler's aims of bringing Austria "back into the fold" of the Reich coincided with the hopes the German and Austrian population and government had held for a long time. Ever since the decision of the National Assembly in 1919, Vienna had never given up the idea that "German-Austria" - the independent state which had emerged from the former Hapsburg monarchy - should join the Reich 35 . But besides these long-term preconditions, Hitler had other reasons for risking the decisive step in February and March 1938. Mention has already been made of the regrouping in the leadership of the armed forces accomplished just previously, which was a pre-requisite for Hitler adopting an adventurous course in foreign policy; the assertive role of Field Marshal Goering during the whole of the crisis also cannot be overlooked. 
 
 However, seen in retrospect, the factor which turned the balance was the neutrality of the British, which was expected with almost complete certainty; for it was the British who were regarded as the decisive factor in the shaping of European affairs. Chancellor Schoschnigg, the successor to Engelbert Dollfuss, who had been murdered in 1934, was at the head of an Austrian government, which could only be described as a fascist-clerical dictatorship 36 . It was eventually his policy, which gave Hitler the excuse for aggressive measures. As is well known, Hitler received the Austrian leader on 12 February 1938 for talks in Berchtesgaden 37 , basically in order to present him with an ultimatum. 
 
 According to Hitler's wishes, among other things the foreign policy of the two countries was to be co-ordinated and the National Socialist Seyss-Inquart was to take over as Minister for the Interior in the Republic - and thus take control of the police force. In addition, the Austrian government was to allow the presence of the Nazi Party again and conduct itself favourably vis-à-vis the German economy. Hitler's demands were lent visible emphasis through a demonstration of military force. While Hitler was talking to his Austrian quests, Generals of the Luftwaffe - incidentally without their knowing the reason for their own presence-were staying at the Berghof, demonstrating to the Austrian leader and his Foreign Minister the military determination of the Reich. 
 
 On his return to Vienna, intimidated and desperate, Schuschnigg chose the course of head-on fight. He called his country to a national referendum 'for a free and German, socialise and independent, Christian and united Austria'. Significantly enough, the Chancellor only wanted to allow those over 24 years old to vote. For the youth of the upper classes in Vienna particularly were so enthusiastic out Hitler, his Reich and National Socialism, that they would certainly never have supported a decision made against Berlin. To the young people of the leading circles in the old capital of Vienna at that time, there seemed to Berlin no problem at all about German-Austria "returning home" to the Reich sooner or later. Economic misery had his Austria badly too, and middle class people had found their chances at economic betterment seriously impaired. It was in view of this that they particularly saw the hope of improving their social position in absorption of the Republic into a greater Reich. In the light of the almost ceaseless propaganda on the theme of colonies being drummed up in Germany, some were already dreaming of stepping into the role of Hitler's colonial governor in African possessions of the Reich, which by that time would also Berlin powerful overseas 38 . But only two days after announcing the plebiscite, the Chancellor had to admit defeat, submit to German pressure and call off the vote. Goering's pressure for a quick military solution had been successful; Berlin could rest assured of Mussolini's benevolent attitude. At 1938.45 pm on the evening of 11 March 1938, Hitler gave the order to march the following day. The invasion by German troops did not proceed without some technical hitches; clearly, the armed forces were only in a state of strictly limited war preparedness after all. 
 
 A decisive factor in the course and sequel to the Austrian crisis was the fact that only two seeks after the event, Great Britain acknowledge the unilateral act on the part of the German Reich. Indeed, soon afterwards it also recognised the Italian Impero, that is it sanctioned the fate of the Abyssinian Empire defeated by fascist Italy, and with it abandoned a further member of the League of Nations 39 . Of course, protests were heard against the aggressive military methods adopted by the Germans, but in principle, the Austrian 'return home' did not seem to arouse London all that much. Britain's was a thoroughly consistent attitude, when we bear in mind the continuity in British policy revealed here and in the statements of Simons and Lord Halifax. For Hitler's move against Vienna could hardly have troubled Chamberlain in his major conception. On the contrary, except for the crude and rather 'unreasonable', that is non-peaceful, means he adopted, Hitler's move was basically in line with British expectations. As a first stage British intentions were to make concessions to the Reich in Europe. London regarded this as essential to enable Britain to hold talks with Berlin about the colonial issue as the prelude to the second stage - discussions on the thorny problem of arms limitation and the establishment of world peace. But in Great Britain, discussion with the Reich on their colonial demands had to Berlin dropped for the time being, so as not to expose the government to attack from the Opposition for their being too soft towards g. in principle, however, it was this very issue of colonial demands which, together with the lever of "economic appeasement" applied chiefly in south-eastern Europe 40 , the British government planned to use as a bait to bring Hitler to the conference table. They intended allowing him a power base of partial hegemony with a secured economic supremacy in central and south-eastern Europe, while at the same time hoping to prevent him by this means from threatening the very existence of the British Empire on the continent or overseas. 
 
 In strife-ridden France there was no great surprise at the fact that relatively soon after the Austrian affair Hitler once again took up the colonial question through his diplomats. On the contrary, a little illogically, and failing to recognise Hitler's phased planning, some political circles in Paris seemed to believe that in Nazi Germany was showing an interest in Africa, the it would not cast in interested eye across the Rhine towards the French motherland, basically, neither Paris nor London understood the essential dual function of the colonial demands. Although it is true that they emerged increasingly as long-term aims of German foreign policy, nevertheless up to and even after the outbreak of was on 1933 September 1939 their primary purpose was a tactical one - diverting attention from the continental demands. Hardly a single career diplomat or politician in London or Paris managed to see this. This was all the more remarkable in view of the fact that the Austrian Statesman 41 , appearing in its home country, managed to recognise the largely functional nature of the colonial demands in Hitler's policy, even during the Austrian events - much like the perceptive analysis of Marius Moutet, the French Colonial Minister of the previous year. 
 
 In Great Britain those in responsible government positions continued to believe firmly in the view that this very problem of colonies would Berlin of decisive help in making it possible to have discussions with the Germans on a calm footing. For at the beginning of March 1938 - before the final phase of the Austrian issue - the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson 42 , announced an important diplomatic initiative by his government. 43 . There was to be no more talk about preliminary concessions, but instead the intention was to achieve the aim of world peace by adopting the colonial path and coming to economic agreements. However, in deference to British public opinion talks on the colonial issue, which was regarded as the bridge towards better understanding, had for the moment to be postponed. They were to be taken up again when the volatile and capricious public opinion of the British democracy had turned its attention to some other question. 
 
 Hitler's power was now greater than ever before, both at home and in the foreign field. His popularity had reached a new peak and his policies were flowing smoothly and successfully. But in the course of 1938, members of the Officer Corps as well as representatives of the economy were recognising with increasing clarity that for personal as well as for social and armament reasons, Hitler's Germany was resolutely adopting a course geared to war. Hjalmar Schacht was one of the first to recognise that the financial and economic policies being adopted by the Reich would inevitable lead to war. He was that debts of the kind being accumulated would only be covered through plunder and looting if bankruptcy was to be avoided. Unflaggingly, but in vain, Schacht worked at creating a political alternative to Hitler's war course of primarily continental expansion. As an alternative he advocated a plan of "liberal imperialist" expansionism directed overseas 44 . His attempt failed because the Fuehrer regarded his own Program as unalterable and proven through his successes in the field of foreign policy. In no small way Schacht's collaboration with Hitler on financial policy at the beginning of his regime had made Hitler's Program possible. For a long time after that Hitler's policies may have matched the interests of the important partners of the National Socialist Government in the heavy industries. As political factors, these forces had stood on an equal footing with the Nazi Party up to 1936; but for a long time that had no longer been the case. Instead, they had become dominated by the Party and Fuehrer through Goering's organisation of an arms economy preparing for the coming war. And yet the policy of the Third Reich with its ultimate consequence, war, enabled these very forces to look after their own pressing economic interests. Under state protection, these groups were able to make considerable profits in the armaments business and its off-shoot industries 45 . These economic and social elements were dictatorially used by Hitler to serve his ideas and aims and in so doing they supported the materialisation of these aims while at the same time temporarily ensuring the continuation of the existing social structure. It was Hitler, his Program and these compliant elements who were pushing towards the war which by the autumn of 1938 could only have been avoided with great difficulty. 
 
 
 References: 
 
 
 30.From all the extensive literature on the question of the annexation' cf. the works by U. Eichstaedt, Von Dollfuss zu Hitler, Geschichte des Anschlusses Oesterreichs 1933–1938 , Wiesbaden, 1955, and J. Gehl, Germany and the Anschluss , London/New York/Toronto, 1963. 
 31.Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik , pp. 406 ff. 
 32.J. R. von Salis, Weltgeschichte der Neuesten Zeit , vol. 3, Zuerich, 2nd ed., 1962, p. 594. 
 33.Cf. the work by K. Middlemas on the foundations of Chamberlain's foreign policy. 
 34.See also F. Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen , pp. 205 ff. and pp. 289 ff. Admittedly the decisive factor was the British-German collaboration in preserving or bringing about peace and the localisation of conflict. 
 35.In this connection compare the plans for partition of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy already entertained by Bismarck, see p. 6 of this work. 
 36.See U. Eichstaedt, Von Dollfuss zu Hitler , loc. cit. 
 37.Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische Aussenpolitik , pp. 439 ff. 
 38. ADAP , D. V, No. 152, p. 172 f. 
 39.On the German attitude to the Abyssinia problem cf. M. Funke, Der internationale Abessinienkonflikt , loc. cit. 
 40.See particularly the study by B.-J. Wendt, Economic appeasement. Also B.-J. Wendt, Appeasement 1938. Wirtschaftliche Rezession und Mitteleuropa , Frankfurt/M., 1966. 
 41.Bundesarchiv Koblenz, ZSG III 1610: the Australian Statesman of 23 February 1938. 
 42.On Sir Nevile Henderson and his policy cf. the dissertation by R. Strauch, Sir Nevile Henderson. Britischer Botschafter in Berlin von 1937–1939. Ein Beitrag yur diplomatischen Vorgeschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges , Diss. Bonn, 1959. 
 43. ADAP , D. I, No. 131, p. 186 f. 
 44.See also Hillgruber, Kontinuitaet , p. 23. 
 45.On all these problems see the introduction of T. Mason's documentation of the social history of the Third Reich, in preparation.